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NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
t ROBERT KINGSLEY
Department Editors.....................ROBERT

L. GROVER

COMMENTS
ADMIRALTY-LIBEL FOR VIOLATION

OF CUSTOMS REGULATIONS-INTERVEN-

LIBUE FOR REPAIRS.-[Federal] The Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to Sections 454 and 459 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and articles 244, 245,
246 and 254 of the Customs Regulations of 1931, assessed penalties in the
amount of $2100 against the pilot and master in charge of one Fairchild
Seaplane on account of failure to give advanced notice of arrival in the
United States from British Columbia; for failure to make a first landing at
an airport of entry as designated by the Secretary of the Treasury; for
failure to make an immediate report to the Collector of Customs; and for
unloading a passenger without permit. The libel asked that upon default
in the payment of the imposed penalties the same be impressed as a lien
against the seaplane and its engine and appurtenances and that they be sold
to satisfy the same. In addition to this libel by the United States, an intervening libel was filed by the Northwest Air Service which alleged that said
company had expended for labor and material the sum of $1,268.72 upon
said seaplane after its arrival in the United States at the express request
of the owner thereof. This libel asked that a first and prior lien be impressed on said seaplane, its engine and appurtenances and that the same
be sold to satisfy said lien.
The government excepted to the intervening libel on the ground that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, or to give the
federal court jurisdiction of the libel, inasmuch as the cause of action was
not grounded upon a maritime contract or lien, and that the court was
without admiralty jurisdiction to entertain the suit for the reason that the
services rendered did not constitute a maritime contract in that said seaplane
was not a vessel within the admiralty jurisdiction of any court in the United
States. Held: "The jurisdiction of the Court over the res under the libel
of the United States being unquestioned, other courts are without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint of the intervening libellant and, therefore,
whatever the nature of its claim against the res, it must be asserted in this
cause." United States v. One Fairchild Seaplane, etc., 4 F. Supp. 249, 233
C. C. H. 3109 (D. C. Wash. 1933).
Whether or not a seaplane is to be treated as a "vessel," so that actions
concerning it are to be treated as within admiralty jurisdiction is a question
as yet unsettled. In Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp.,' the Court
of Appeals of New York held that a seaplane, moored and floating on
navigable waters, was a "vessel" insofar as jurisdiction over an attempt to
recover for injuries to its watchman was concerned. In what is apparently
the only reported case involving a repairman's lien, the same judge who
ING

1.

232 N. Y. 115. 133 N. E. 371, 18 A. L.

(1921).
[1491

. 1324, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 4
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decided the instant case refused to allow an admiralty proceeding to enforce the lien,2 basing his decision principally on the absence of any express
legislation on the subject3 Neither of these decisions is determinative of
the instant case. By express statute, the penalties imposed by the customs
laws for failure of an aircraft to comply with the applicable regulations is

enforceable by proceedings in rem, which "shall conform as nearly as may
be to civil suits in admiralty."4

Such was the nature of the original pro-

ceeding here. To allow a person holding a claim against the aircraft to
intervene in such an action is by no means to hold that he might file an
original libel.
ROBERT

AIRPORTS-ESTABLISHMENT

KINGSLEY.

AND MAINTENANCE OF A MUNICIPAL AIRPORT

AS A PUBLIC PURPOSE.-[Pennsylvania] The uncertainty of legal rights which
once attended the municipal acquisition, ownership and operation of airports
and landing fields is at present fairly well dispelled, but two recent cases
would seem to indicate that the legal profession is not yet entirely reconciled
to municipal participation in aviation. In the case of Reinhart v. MacGuffie
et al.1 the County Commissioners of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, agreed
to contribute two-thirds of the expenses of an airport to be maintained
in co-operation with the city of Wilkesbarre, operation and management to
be joint. An action was brought to restrain the payment of any county
funds for airport purposes on the grounds (1) that such payment would be
an appropriation of public funds or credit for private purposes, contrary to
the constitution, and (2) that the county had no authority to sponsor or
finance an airport. In Armstrong v.. Wayne County Board of Auditors,2
complainant sought to prevent the levy of further taxation for the maintenance of an airport constructed in 1928 upon (1) the ingenious contention
that the legislation enabling the initial bond issue and tax levy therefor was
an unconstitutional interference with internal improvements and (2) that
the county had no power to construct an airport. The bills of complaint
in both cases were dismissed.
Municipal (including county) airport activities have been declared in
various ways to be endowed with a public purpose, the term being adapted
to the obstacles presented in the various cases. But in every case thus far
reported the result has been to uphold the legality of the maintenance and
operation of the airport. Thus in cases where city charter provisions required, the airport has been declared a public utility,s or within a limited
2.

Crawford Bros., No. 2, 215 Fed. 269, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 1 (D. C. Wash.

1914), discussed in: 28 Harv. L.. Rev. 200 (1914) ; 3 Cal. L. Rev. 143 (1915).
3. "In view of the novelty and complexity of the questions that must
necessarily arise out of this new engine of transportation and commerce, it appears to the Court that in the absence of legislation conferring jurisdiction,

none would obtain in this Court, and that questions such as those raised by
the libellant must be relegated to the common-law courts of general jurisdiction."
4. Air Commerce Act of May 20, 1926, c. 344, §11(b), 49 U. S. C. §181(b).
1. Penn. Ct. of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, decided May, 1939, 233
C. C. H. 3129.

2.

Circuit Court of Wayne County, Mich., No. 205,086, decided Aug. 29,

1933.
3. State ex rel. Chandler v. Jackson, 121 0. 126, 167 N. E. 396 (1929)
State ex rel. City of Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N. W. 273 (1929),
noted In 14 Ia. L. Rev. 233 (1929).
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public purpose requirement;4 where the purpose of a park statute was required to be met, the landing field has been termed conducive to amusement
and recreation;5 where general municipal enabling statutes or general grants
G'
of municipal power were concerned, courts have said that obvious legislative intent to keep abreast of the times would support the extension of
7
The cases reveal
the "public purpose" classification to airport operation.
questions,
the
principal motivatthat in spite of varying presentations of the
ing factor in the result has been uniform. It is succinctly stated in Hesse
v. Rath: a "Aviation today is an established method of transportation. The
future, even the near future, will make it still more general. The city that
is without the foresight to build the ports for the new traffic may soon beleft behind in the race of competition. Chalcedon was called the city of the
blind, because its founders rejected the nobler site of Byzantium laying at
their feet. The need for vision of the future in the governance of cities has
not lessened with the years. The dwellers within the gates, even more than
the stranger from afar, will pay the price of blindness."
The argument of extension of public credit for a private purpose has
been relied upon in several cases for the defeat of municipal participation in
construction of landing fieldsY Supporting this argument is the contention
10
that such a field is for the benefit of a very limited section of the public.
In the MacGuffie case" the court solved the difficulty by pointing out that
4. Dysart v. City of St. Louis 321 Mo. 514, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1928),
noted in 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 441 (1929) ; Ennis v. Kansas City, 321 Mo. 536,
11 S. W. (2d) 1054 (1928).
5. Schmoldt v. City of Oklahoma City, 144 Okla. 208 291 P. 119 (1930),
noted in 1 Air L. Rev. 481 (1930), 17 Va. L. Rev. 165 (1930) ; City of Wichita
v. Clapp, 125 Kans. 500, 263 P. 12 (1928), noted in 12 Minn. L. Rev. 549
In the Schmoldt case the court sup(1928), 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1004 (1928).
ported its conclusion that the airport was a proper park purpose in the following rhapsodical language: "The public would enjoy an airplane exhibition, to
see an airplane glide gently to the earth and take to the air again as gracefully
as an eagle in its flight, and ponder over the wonderful accomplishments of the
airplane."
6. McClintock v. City of Roseburg, 127 Or. 698, 273 P. 331 (1931), noted
in 8 Tenn. L. Rev. 64 (1929) ; State ex rel. City of Walla Walla v. Clausen,
157 Wash. 457, 289 P. 61 (1930) ; City of Spokane v. Williams 157 Wash. 120,
288 P. 258 (1930), noted in 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 94 (1931) ; Doughty v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 141 A. 499 (Md. App. 1928) ; Wentz v.
City of Philadelphia, 301 Pa. 261, 151 A. 883 (1930), noted in 20 Natl. Mun.
Rev. 44 (1931) ; H se v. Rath, 294 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 (1928), aff'g 224
App. Div. 344, 230 N. Y. S. 676 (1928), noted in 15 Va. L. Rev. 491 (1929),
33 Law Notes 33 (1929); In re Airport of City of Utica, 234 N. Y. S. 668
(1929).
7. State ex rel. City of Walla Walla v. Clausen, supra note 6.
8. Supra note 6.
9. State ex rel. Hile v. City of Cleveland et al., 26 0. App. 265, 160 N. E.
241 (1927) ; Dysart v. City of St. Louis, supra note 4 ; Wentz v. City of Philadelphia, supra note 6.
10. In Dysort v. City of St. Louis, supra note 4, the court rejected the
following language of the lower court:
"It (the airport) will afford a starting and landing place for a few wealthy,
ultra-reckless persons, who own planes and are engaged in private pleasure
flying. . . . It will afford a starting and landing place for pleasure tourists
from other cities, alighting in St. Louis while flitting here and yon, It will
offer a passenger station for the very few persons who are able to afford, and
who desire to experience, the thrill of a novel and expensive mode of luxurious
transportation."
"In the very nature of things, the vast majority of the inhabitants of the
city, a 99 per cent. majority, cannot now and never can, reap any benefit from
the existence of an airport
"True it may be permitted to the ordinary common garden variety of citizen to enter the airport free of charge, so that he may press his face against
some restricting barrier, and sunburn his throat, gazing at his more fortunate
compatriots as they sportingly navigate the empyrean blue."
"But beyond that, beyond the right to hungrily look on, the ordinary citizen
gets no benefit from the taxes he is forced to pay."
Cf. City of Wichita v. Clapp, supra note 5, for the opposite view.
11. Supra note 1.
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all the public did not benefit from any public improvement, and that the
determination of the degree of public benefit necessary to make the project
a public one lay to a great extent within the discretion of the
municipality itself. Such a result is proper, since the factors which determine the public benefit are often peculiarly local, and should be left to
the judgment of those best acquainted with them, i. e., the local authorities.
The Oregon court,12 confronted with the same contention, held that the
municipality might anticipate broadened future public benefits, in spite of the
present limited scope of the benefit.18
The MacGuffie case points out that the public credit doctrine is dangerladen in its application to a present practice in municipal airport management. In many instances, municipalities lease their airports to private corporations, or enter into management or financing contracts with them. In
the MacGuffie case there was joint management, and the court sounded a
warning that such agreements would be very carefully scrutinized for any
evidence of unfair distribution of expenses or subsidy: "We did find that
the mechanic employed by the [public] board of management was also
privately employed, and payments made for his services were made to the
Airport Corporation, and while the amount was nominal, we condemned the
practice and directed its discontinuance." The ordinary public operation of
an airport, apart from the practice above outlined, does not support the
charge of extension of public credit for private use, regardless of who uses
the port. As yet no cases have arisen under statutory provisions which
allow the leasing of airports to private corporations. If the terms of the
lease provide for a purely nominal rental, as might be necessary under
present economic conditions, the extension of public credit argument will
undoubtedly be raised in attempt to defeat such an indirect subsidy. There
is an intimation in the Dysart'4 case that the same considerations which
motivated courts to approve municipal subsidies of railroads three-quarters
of a century ago might prevail today.
The two instant cases do no more than strengthen a well-buttressed
doctrine. In all probability further attacks on municipal participation in air
transportation will be shifted to less well-settled grounds, such as management agreements, or the extension of municipal police power beyond corporate limits.
ROBERT L. GROVER.
CRIMES-LIENS-PRIORITY

OF CHATTEL

MORTGAGE

OVER LIEN FOR VIOLA-

TION OF AIR COMMERCE REGULATIONS.- [Federal] The owner of the airplane
in question flew the plane from Mexico to an airport in the United States
without giving prior notice to the appropriate Collector of Customs and
did not make his first landing at an official airport of entry-all in violation
of the Air Commerce Act and the Regulations promulgated thereunder.,
At the time of this flight the plane was subject to a valid chattel mortgage
12.
13.
14.

Mc~lintock v. City of Roseburg, supra note 6.
Cf. comment, 1 Air L. Rev. 139 (1930).
Supra note 4.

1. Act of May 20 1926, c.344, §§7(b) & 11(b) 44 Stat. at L. 568, 572 &
574, 49 U. S. C. §§171(b) & 181(b) ; Foreign Air Commerce Reg. of Nov. 5,
1930, [1930] U. S. Av. Rep. 378; Aircraft Customs Reg. of Jan. 3, 1929
[1929] U. S. Av. R. 267; Airports of Entry Reg. of Nov. 1, 1931, [1932]
U. S. Av. R. 295.

NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
in favor of the intervenor, who had no notice or knowledge of this breach
of law. A libel was filed against the plane to enforce the lien for the
penalty provided by the Act for such violations. It was stipulated that the
sole issue was whether the intervenor's mortgage-lien was prior or subject to
that of the government. Held, that the intervenor's lien was prior. United
States v. One Waca Bi-plane, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 159 (D. C. Ariz. Dec. 1932).
This is apparently a case of first impression, no cases directly in point
being cited by the parties and none having been found by the present writer.
The Air Commerce Act provides that the violation of the regulations here
in question shall subject the violator "to a civil penalty of $500.
In case the violation is by the owner or person in command of the aircraft, the penalty shall be a lien against the aircraft. Any civil penalty imposed under this section may be collected

.

.

.

in case the penalty is a

lien, by proceedings in rem against the aircraft. Such proceedings shall
conform as nearly as may be to civil suits in admiralty . . ",2 The parties
agreed that the reference to admiralty referred solely to matters of procedure and did not make either the government's or the intervenor's liens
subject to the substantive rules of maritime law. The argument for the
intervenor, which was adopted by the court, was that, since the statute provided merely for a lien to enforce a penalty and not for confiscation of the
property, there had been no intention to cut off the rights of innocent third
parties but that, the penalty being primarily an obligation of the violator,
the lien attached to his equity only. While the point is not entirely free
from difficulty, since (as pointed out by counsel for the government) there
is a general policy in favor of proceedings to enforce the customs laws, the
decision is probably c9rrect. It is submitted that the problem is of sufficient
importance to justify a clarification of the statute by Congressional action.
ROBERT

KINGSLEY.

GASOLINE TAX-COMMERCE-STATE TAX ON GASOLINE USED IN INTERSTATE

COMMERCE.-[Federal]

Plaintiff is engaged in Interstate air transportation

and all of its lines pass through the state of Louisiana.

It imports gaso-

line from Texas and stores it at its Louisiana airports where it is pumped
into its airplanes. A Louisiana statute levies a cumulative tax of five cents

per gallon upon all motor fuel sold, used or consumed in the state for domestic consumption. A suit to enjoin collection of the tax was brought by
plaintiff on the ground that the tax is a charge for the privilege of using
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Held: Bill dismissed. This tax
is levied upon the "use" of gasoline within the state of Louisiana. The "use"
here is the withdrawal of the gasoline from storage and it is immaterial
that the gasoline is destined for fueling an instrumentality of interstate
commerce: American Airways, Inc. v. Grosjean, 3 F. Supp. 995 (E. D.
La. 1933). The United States Supreme Court affirmed the District Court
decree in a per curiam decision and denied a petition for a rehearing. 233
C. C. H. 3139.
The court merely followed earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States.' It is at the time of withdrawal of the gasoline from
storage alone that "use" is measured for the purposes of the tax.
2.

Act of May 20, 1926, c. 344, §11(b),

C. §181(b).

44 Stat. at L. 568, 574, 49 U. S.

1. Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 591
(1933)
Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345
(1933)
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631 (1932).
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It is now impossible for an interstate air transportation company to
avoid paying a gasoline tax in every state in which it refuels its planes.
If gasoline is purchased within the state the gasoline is subject to a sales
tax. 2 If it is imported from another state it is subject to a tax upon its
withdrawal from storage.8
RAYMOND I.

NEGLIGENCE-CARRIERS-ExISTENCE

OF PASSENGER-CARRIER

SUEKOFF.

4

RELATIONSHIP

Plaintiff's intestate purchased transportation by airplane from defendant's predecessor in
interest. Due to fog conditions, the pilot attempted to make an emergency
landing on private property, crashed and he and plaintiff's intestate were
both killed. Plaintiff having recovered judgment in the trial court,1 defendant appealed, contending: (1) that the relationship between its predecessor and the decedent was that of charterer-charteree rather than that of
carrier-passenger; (2) that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence
to make a case for a jury; and (3) that, by virtue of a clause to the
effect in the "ticket," defendant's liability was limited to the sum of $10,000.
Held: (1) that decedent was a passenger; (2) that the evidence sufficiently showed negligence on the part of the pilot to support the verdict;
and (3) that defendant's predecessor was a "common carrier" and that,
therefore, an attempt to limit its liability for negligence was void. CurtissWright Flying Service v. Glose, 66 Fed. (2d) 711, 1933 U. S. Av. Rep. 26,
233 C. C. H. 3123 (C. C. A. 3d 1933).
(1) The existence of a carrier-passengerrelationship. The contention
here made by the defendant, that the purchaser of air transportation should
be considered merely as a charterer of the craft and crew is novel in air
litigation, though the idea has been somewhat mooted among the members
of the aviation industry. If the contention were well founded in fact, the
result would be that the air operator's obligation was only to furnish an
airworthy plane and a competent crew, and that it was not liable for negligence of the pilot.2 The instant case, in rejecting the contention, does so
solely on the ground that, under the facts presented, no such relationship
was shown to exist. Stress is laid on two elements: (1) that the contract
itself was denominated a "ticket," the parties were referred to therein as
"the passenger" and "the carrier" and the word "charter" was nowhere present in the agreement; (2) that provisions of the agreement, especially
clauses reserving all control to the operator and a clause giving the operator
the power to cancel the "revocable license" created, were "compatible with
a passenger-carrying service, but not with a charter." The case, therefore,
does not stand for the proposition that there can never be a "charter" of
a passenger airplane. There would seem to be no reason why an individual
or a party could not hire a plane for a definite trip, giving to the respective parties the powers usual in such cases-the instant case being authority
-LIMITATION

OF LIABILITY-PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE.-[Federal]

2. Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 285
U. S. 147, 52 S. Ct. 340 (1932).
3. American Airways, Inc. v. Grosjean supra; Edeiman v. Boeing Air

Transport, Inc., supra; Nashville C. L St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, supra; Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query, supra.
4. Of the Chicago Bar.

1.

Glose v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 1933 U. S. Av. R. 228

(D. C. N. J. 1932).
2. See The Nicaragua 72 F. 207, 18 C. C. A. 511 (1896) ; Kerry v. Pacific
Marine Co., 121 Cal. 564, t4 P. 89 (1898) ; and McNair, The Law of the Air,
pp. 152-4.
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merely for the proposition that the powers granted and reserved in the
present contract did not create such a relatively novel relationship.
(2) The evidence of negligence. The parties expressly had conceded
at the trial that the plane was in satisfactory condition and fit for the
journey proposed, and that the pilot was duly qualified. Plaintiff's claims
of negligence were two: (1) That it was unnecessary and negligent for
the pilot to attempt to land on the particular place selected by him-the
evidence showing (a) that another plane flying near to that of the defendant
had proceeded successfully with its journey and landed safely at the terminal airport for which the fatal ship was bound, and (b) that there were
other and properly equipped emergency fields in the immediate neighborhood, whereas the spot selected for this landing was small, surrounded by
many obstacles and transversed by ditches; (2) that the pilot was negligent
in the manner of landing on the field-there being evidence showing violation of various Department of Commerce regulations.3 The court held
that the evidence on these two points was sufficient to go to the jury.
(3) The effect of the limitation of liability provision. The court's
method of attack on this problem is of importance. It points out that there
has existed a well settled rule of decision in the federal courts to the effect
that such a limitation by a common carrier by land is void, 4 and holds
that, under the evidence which showed a general holding out by the defendant, it was a common carrier by air. The court then addresses itself to
the problem of the extent to which the rules applicable to carriage by land
may be applied to carriage by air and concludes that the treatment should
be the same, saying:
"Such being the settled law, why should it not be applied to airplane
passenger service? What reason is there why the same principles applicable
to land and water should not also be applied to air transportation?
. .
All alike perform the same service, viz., transportation. They are competitors for the same class of business. Every passenger carried by airplane means a passenger less for the railroad or the steamship. Transportation, as its derivation denotes, is a carrying across, and, whether the carrying
be by rail, by water or by air, the purpose in view and the thing done are
identical in result.5
Such an attitude is significant. The idea has been expressed from time
to time by zealous aviation enthusiasts that air transportation, because
of its physical novelty, demanded the creation of an entirely novel set of
legal rules, to be fashioned from a new bolt of legal cloth without regard
to those in existence for other forms of transportation. That air transportation does create its own problems is obvious; but the writer submits
that, so far as possible, old rules should be applied and that the burden
lies squarely upon those who would seek to avoid the application of such
rules and substitute new ones to show some compelling reason therefor;
and that, since nothing of the sort here appears, the court was correct in
the instant case in applying the land rule.
ROBERT KINGSLEY.

3.

Particularly Air Traffic Rules Nos. 74, 75 and 79.

Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 1933

U.

S.

Av. R.

228,

Consult: Glose v.
233

and 241-242

(D. C. N. J. 1932).
4. Citing: Bank of. Kentucky v. Adams Exp. Co. 93 U. S. 174, 23 L.
872 (1876); Kansas City So. Ry. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760, 51 Sup.
304, 75 L. Ed. 684 (1931) ; Delaivare, L. d W. Ry. v. Ashley, 67 Fed. 209
C. A. Third Circuit, 1895).
5. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. v. Glose, 66 Fed. (2d) 710,
(C. C. A. 3d 1983).

Ed.
Ct.
(C.
712
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DIGESTS
CONTRACTS-SALES-"REQUIREMENT ORDERS"-COU NTER-OFFERS.-[ Kansas]

Defendant submitted to plaintiff a written order for certain specified quantities of wire to be used in the construction of airplanes, the order calling
for shipment over a period of one year at a certain rate per month and
containing the clause "covering approximate yearly requirement, more or
less." The order called, also, for an acknowledgement. Plaintiff sent an
acknowledgement reading in part as follows: ". . . your order . . .
is accepted subject to the following terms and conditions whether or not
they are at variance with terms appearing on your purchase order.
6. On orders for special materials, the right is reserved to ship and bill
10% more or less than the exact quantity specified. 7. Order not subject
to cancellation." Thereafter plaintiff shipped and defendant accepted some
thirteen shipments. Defendant then requested plaintiff to suspend shipments temporarily, and later requested that the order be cancelled or that
plaintiff dispose of the merchandise to other parties. Plaintiff, having been
successful in disposing of only a small quantity to other purchasers,
brought the present action for damages for breach of contract. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's petition, in which the above facts
were set forth, on the theory that the defendant's communication was only
a so-called "requirement order," i. e., an order for so much only of the specified quantity as defendant might need in its business. Held: (1) Whether
this was a proper construction of defendant's original order is now immaterial, since (2) plaintiff's "acknowledgement," because it contained the
two important additional conditions above quoted, was not an acceptance
of defendant's original offer, but a counter-offer (citing: Hayes v. Possehl,
92 Kan. 609, 141 Pac. 559 (1914); Restatement, Contracts (1932) §60),
which defendant had accepted by its conduct (citing: Restatement, Contracts (1932) §§29, 63 and 72). Belden Mfg. Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Airplane
Co., 22 P. (2d) 494, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 256 (Kan. June 10, 1933).
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
CRIMES-TRANSPORTATION

OF LIQUOR BY

AIRCRAFT-CERTIORARI.-[N.

Y.

Sup. Ct.] The United States Supreme Court on October 16, 1933, denied
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the case of Vinkemulder v. U. S., 64 F. (2d) 535, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 65,
233 C. C. H. 3131.
For digest of facts in case, see 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 438.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.

INSURANCE-FIRE INSURANcE-HANGAR

A TRADE FIXTURE-DELIVERY

OF

POLICY-PROOF OF Loss.-[Kansas] Plaintiffs, in three consolidated actions
to recover on two insurance policies covering a hangar which was destroyed

by fire, were the owner and the mortgagee of the hangar. Plaintiff owner
had erected the hangar on leased premises. The insurance contracts concerned in these actions were issued to the owner for cash and a promissory
note payable in 70 days, it being agreed that the insurance agent was to
hold the policies until the note was paid. The hangar was destroyed by
fire before payment of the note and delivery of the policies, and the defendant insurance company resisted payment of the insurance. This action
was brought and the verdict of the jury in the lower court was for the
plaintiff in the amount of the policies; and judgment was entered accordingly. Defendants had demurred to plaintiff's evidence on the ground (1)
that plaintiff, Lee Lawson, was not the owner of the hangar and had no
insurable interest in it; (2) that at the time the insurance contracts were
effected defendants were iot aware that the hangar was on leased premises;
(3) that defendants did not know that plaintiff, Nathaniel Lawson, had a
mortgage on the hangar; (4) that plaintiff, Lee Lawson, had misrepresented
the facts and overstated the value of the hangar and that therefore by
the terms of the policies they were void; (5) that formal proof of loss
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had never been made by plaintiffs. Appeal was taken on the errors assigned and the over-ruling of the demurrers and the judgments affirmed.
Nathaniel Lawson et al. v. Southern Fire Insurance Company, et al., 137
Kan. 473, 21 P. (2d) 387, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 38 (State of Kansas, Supreme
Court, May 6, 1933).
Held: (1) Although the policies never came into the manual possession
of the plaintiff, under the circumstances they became effective according to
their tenor on the dates of their execution. (2) Plaintiff, Lee Lawson,
was the sole and unconditional owner of the hangar within the terms of the
policies although he had acquired the hangar for various considerations
which included a sum of money to be paid in annual installments, only 2/5
of which had been paid. (3) Defendant's agent had been apprised of the
fact that the hangar was on leased ground, and defendants cannot defeat
the policies by relying on a paragraph in the policies requiring a fee-simple
title in realty, since the hangar was in the nature of a trade fixture or
personal property and insured as such. (4) Plaintiff's omission to submit
formal proof of loss as required by the terms of the policies cannot defeat the obligation of the insurer, since under the circumstances the policies
were not accessible to plaintiff to remind him of such requirements, and
the conduct of defendant's agents after oral notice of the fire was bound
to throw plaintiff off his guard as to such requirement.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.

Plaintiff's intestate was a
NEGLIGENcE-DEGREE OF CARE.-[Federal]
passenger on an airplane owned and operated by defendant on an airline
between Los Angeles, California, and El Paso, Texas. The plane ran into
fog while going through San Gorgonio Pass, near Banning, California. and
crashed into a mountain, killing the pilot and passengers. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, plaintiff's motion for a new
trial was denied, and plaintiff appealed, assigning as error: (1) that the
evidence did not support the verdict and that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a new trial; and (2) that there was error in the instructions on the subject of degree of care. Held: (1) there was evidence
sufficient to sustain the verdict and the action of a trial court in passing
on a motion for a new trial is not reviewable on appeal; (2) the alleged
errors in the instructions cannot be passed on, since plaintiff did not take
his exceptions thereto in the manner required by court rule. Allison, Admr.
v. Standard Air Lines, Inc., 65 F. (2d) 668, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 92, 233 C.
C. H. 3093 (C. C. A. 9th June 5, 1933).
The action of the trial court in the instant case (1930 U. S. Av. R. 292)
was the subject of a discussion in an earlier number of the JOURNAL (2
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 71 (1931)).

In view of the interesting and important

problems raised, it is regrettable that the appeal had to be decided on
technical rules of procedure.
ROBERT KINGSLEY.
PATENTS-USE

BY THE UNITED

STATES-IMPLIED CONTRACT-STATUTE OF

LmITATIONS.-[Federal] Prior to January, 1917, the development of the
aircraft industry in the United States was seriously retarded by the existence of a chaotic situation concerning the validity and ownership of
basic aeronautical patents. Certain companies were threatening infringement
suits, with the result that the industry was generally demoralized, making
it impossible for the government to obtain fulfillment of its orders. In
addition the license fee paid on planes manufactured was so high as to be
excessive, and since the Army and Navy were the principal purchasers the
burden was in effect falling upon the Federal Government. Rather than
expend the time and money necessary to condemn these patent rights, the
United States, through its Secretaries of War and Navy and its specially
created National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, worked out a scheme
whereby a group of aircraft manufacturers were induced to incorporate an
organization under the laws of New York known as "The Aircraft Manu-
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facturers Association." The patentees, on their part, agreed to pool their
rights in this association, to which only responsible manufacturers could
become "subscribers" or stockholders. It was provided, however, that no
stockholder could acquire more than one share, and that only members
were eligible to become subscribers to the cross-license agreement, which,
together with the by-laws, provided for the issuance of licenses to use the
patented devices owned or controlled by the association. The agreement
also called for the payment of royalties to the association at the rate of
$200 on airplanes and division between participating patentees. The agreement was endorsed by all parties concerned, including the United States.
Thus as to airplanes manufactured by subscribers either the United States or
the manufacturer paid the royalty to the plaintiff association. But as to
planes purchased from non-subscribers the United States agreed impliedly,
if not in fact, at the time of the consummation of the plan, to pay the
royalty.
This suit involves $363,500 in royalties which the plaintiff claims is due
upon 2,216 airplanes owned by the United States, but manufactured by nonsubscribers and not reported to the plaintiff. The claim was approved by
the Secretaries of War and Navy, but disallowed bp the Comptroller General. Although no formal agreement was entered into by the parties as to
these particular planes, the plaintiff bases its claim upon an implied contract
to report and pay for them.
The Court of Claims, speaking through Judge Littleton, held that under
Section 145 of the Judicial Code a claim based upon a contract implied in
fact (not in law) constituted a good cause of action. That in this case,
"the acts and conduct of the parties, and their relations, established an
implied contract on the part of the Government to pay the plaintiff the royalties which it now claims," especially in view of the fact that the Government
sponsored this Association and practically dictated its own terms in order
that the patents might be made available to it without the necessity of entering impending infringement litigation or condemnation proceedings. The
Court further held that none of the elements of a patent infringement were
present here; that the suit was not so grounded, but was properly based upon
an implied contract to pay the royalty stipulated. In passing over a plea
in bar under the Statute of Limitations the Court held that the cause of
action did not accrue, in this particular case, upon the delivery date of the
airplanes, but rather, under usages established between the parties, after the
reports upon the planes in question had been made by the Government and
invoices rendered thereon by the plaintiff. As to the contention that the
plaintiff was not the absolute owner of the patents, the Court held that not
only did the plaintiff control the patents and have an interest therein, but
the actual patentees were parties to the agreement. The plaintiff had judgment in the amount claimed. Manufacturers Aircraft Association, Inc. v.
United States of America, - C. Cls. -, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 133 (Court of
Claims, May 8, 1933).
ROBERT T. WRIGIHT.
TAXATION-AIRPLANE AS PERSONAL PROPERTY-SITUS OF AIRPLANE.-[Mississippi] The Attorney General of Mississippi in an opinion rendered on
June 7, 1933, to the Tax Assessor of Walthal County, Mississippi, advised
that an airplane should be assessed for taxes for the year as any other personal property in the County where it is located on January 1st.
Opinion of the Attorney General of Mississippi, June 7, 1933, 1933 U. S.
Av. R. 227, 233 C. C. H. 3117.
LORRAINE ARNOLD.

